The Limits of Power (Part 1)

In the US, many consider the "Department of Defense" a misnomer. For a country with troops in over 100 nations, "Department of Offense" seems more accurate. In truth, US military troops overseas aren't intended to defend America or Americans. Under the guise of defending America, they defend the fiat dollar. To actually defend America, a much smaller military would do.

In The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, author Andrew Bacevich, a modern day Smedley (War is a Racket) Butler and Professor of International Relations at Boston University, predicts the end of the American Empire caused by a misguided foreign policy based on "an outsized confidence in the efficacy of American power as an instrument to reshape the global order."[1] Bacevich decries a US foreign policy that uses military power to prop up a financial system enabling continual overindulgence by Americans: what Bacevich calls "the crisis of profligacy."

In an August 15, 2008 interview by award winning journalist and former Johnson administration press secretary, Bill Moyers, Bacevich elaborated on "the crisis of profligacy":

BILL MOYERS: And this is connected, as you say in the book, in your first chapters, of what you call "the crisis of profligacy."

ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, we don't live within our means. I mean, the nation doesn't, and increasingly, individual Americans don't. Our saving - the individual savings rate in this country is below zero. The personal debt, national debt, however you want to measure it, as individuals and as a government, and as a nation we assume an endless line of credit.

As individuals, the line of credit is not endless, that's one of the reasons why we're having this current problem with the housing crisis, and so on. And my view would be that the nation's assumption, that its line of credit is endless, is also going to be shown to be false. And when that day occurs it's going to be a black day, indeed.

The Limits of Power Overseas

In The Limits of Power, Bacevich describes the folly of military officers and national security experts who propagate a fantasy of a military so powerful and with bombs so smart, that war is quick, clean, and effective.[2] A West Point graduate and 20-plus-years career soldier, Bacevich writes that:

"...events in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated definitively that further reliance on coercive methods will not enable the United States to achieve its objectives."[3]

Now that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's "confidential memo" calling for more troops in Afghanistan has been leaked to the public, President Obama (D) would do well to listen to Bacevich:

"America doesn't need a bigger army. It needs a smaller- that is, more modest-foreign policy, one that assigns soldiers missions that are consistent with their capabilities. Modesty implies giving up on the illusions of grandeur... reining in the imperial presidents who expect the army to make good on those illusions. "[4]

The Limits of Power at Home

Bacevich wrote The Limits of Power before the 2008 election, but his logic applies to any administration. They all try to give Americans something for nothing, and fail miserably every time. Bacevich's description of the existing system in Washington, D.C. as a "gang that couldn't shoot straight" forecasts ominous prospects for the future of healthcare after it is re-formed by bureaucrats:

"Regardless of which party is in power, the people in charge don't know what they are doing. As a consequence, policies devised by Washington tend to be extravagant, wasteful, ill-conceived, misguided, unsuccessful, or simply beside the point. To cite examples drawn from just the past several years, think of the bungled efforts to 'reform' the Social Security and health care systems or to fix immigration policy. Think of the inanity of the never-ending 'war on drugs.' "[5]

Bacevich sees symptoms of American overindulgence in the trade imbalance in manufactured goods as Americans export fiat dollars and import manufactured goods (pdf). Bacevich calls the time from 1965 to 1973 a "tipping point" in American history, the start of an excessive consumption by Americans enabled by the US military presence overseas:

BILL MOYERS: You say in here that the tipping point between wanting more than we were willing to pay for began in the Johnson Administration. "We can fix the tipping point with precision," you write. "It occurred between 1965, when President Lyndon Baines Johnson ordered U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam, and 1973, when President Richard Nixon finally ended direct U.S. involvement in that war." Why do you see that period so crucial?

ANDREW BACEVICH: When President Johnson became President, our trade balance was in the black. By the time we get to the Nixon era, it's in the red. And it stays in the red down to the present. Matter of fact, the trade imbalance becomes essentially larger year by year.

So, I think that it is the '60s, generally, the Vietnam period, slightly more specifically, was the moment when we began to lose control of our economic fate. And most disturbingly, we're still really in denial. We still haven't recognized that.

Just as Bacevich predicts the end of the American empire caused by a misguided foreign policy based on force, I predict the end of the fiat dollar and our financial system caused by misguided domestic policies based on “an outsized confidence in the efficacy" of government power "as an instrument to reshape the domestic order." Policy experts, government bureaucrats, and profligate Americans, who want something for nothing, continue to believe an illusion of an all-wise and capable federal government with unlimited resources to solve all problems, despite all evidence to the contrary.

Let's see what happens when the "gang that couldn't shoot straight" gets its hands on healthcare "re-form."

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[1] The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, Andrew Bacevich, Metropolitan Books, N.Y., N.Y., p. 7.

[2] Ibid. p. 127. Listen to any politician bloviate on strategy and you'll hear about "surgical strikes." E.g. This September 22, 2009 NY Times article, "Obama Strategy Shift in Afghan War," outlines V.P. Joe Biden's proposal, which is just what Bacevich is talking about:

"Mr. Biden proposed scaling back the overall American military presence. Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics."

More current examples of defense policy experts: "So Who Were the Advisers for McChrystal’s 60-Day Afghanistan Review?" and "Meeting the Challenge: Time Is Running Out."

[3] Ibid. pp. 162-163. While Bacevich explicitly acknowledges the limits of coercive methods in the Middle East, and sees the flaws of the imperial presidency, he doesn't connect the dots and acknowledge that domestic coercion is an equally limited strategy. E.g. He concedes there are arguments with "indisputable merit" for a draft on page 155.

[4] Ibid. p. 169.

[5] Ibid. p. 71.